The model isn't the perimeter.
Prompt injection isn't a vulnerability class
What actually happens when you deploy a Copilot agent
The guardrail layer is thinner than you think
Every agent framework ships with a system prompt that says "you are a helpful assistant." The attack surface starts in the sentence nobody reads.
Most red-team reports on LLM-based applications test the model. They send adversarial prompts, observe the output, and file findings. This misses the point. The model is a component. The application around it — retrieval, tool calls, output parsing, session management — is where the exploitable logic lives. If you only test the model, you're pen-testing the CPU instead of the app.
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CVE-2024-38109 · CVSS 9.1 · Copilot Studio · SSRF → full tenant compromise
SEVERITY VECTOR AFFECTED PRODUCT READING TIME
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